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What’s That Smell? Why the Tenth Circuit 
Should Discard Its Distinction Between the Odors 
of Burnt and Raw Marijuana* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a unique line of cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit became the first and only federal circuit to adopt a standard 
that alters the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile 
by distinguishing between the odors of burnt and raw marijuana.1  Under 
this principle, a law enforcement officer’s recognition of the smell of raw 
marijuana emanating from inside a vehicle automatically establishes the 
requisite probable cause to search the entire automobile, including the 
trunk or anywhere else narcotics might be concealed.2  However, should 
an officer recognize the smell of burnt marijuana instead, probable cause 
to search the automobile extends only to the passenger compartment 
unless other corroborating evidence provides a reasonable basis to search 
elsewhere.3 
Although development of this rule began with United States v. 
Nielsen,4 the rule’s framework and the legal arguments asserted in 
support of Nielsen have evolved over time.  But the black letter rule 
outlined in Nielsen and its progeny is not the product of legal reasoning 
based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Rather, a closer reading of 
the Nielsen decision indicates that the distinction is based on the Tenth 
Circuit’s determination that the law-enforcement officer manufactured 
testimony to legitimize an otherwise unconstitutional search.  Subsequent 
                                                     
        *  Joshua Bender.  J.D. conferred Dec. 2009, The University of Kansas. 
 1. See Kevin Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Vehicle Searches, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
17 (1999) (“[O]ne court has held that such an odor [burnt marijuana] is not enough, when followed 
by a fruitless search of the passenger compartment, to justify a search of the trunk as the officer 
found nothing to corroborate the odor.”). 
 2. See United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. 
Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 3. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. 
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 4. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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cases that relied on the Nielsen holding eventually solidified a rigid legal 
framework and developed a justification based on constitutional 
principles.  Because Nielsen was driven by a particular outcome rather 
than legal analysis, the Tenth Circuit should follow other federal circuits 
and discard its unique distinction between the odors of burnt and raw 
marijuana.5 
This Comment develops in five parts.  Part II provides a historical 
and contextual backdrop to probable cause and the automobile exception 
to the general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Part III 
provides a closer look at the development of the Tenth Circuit’s unique 
rule, which will be contrasted in Part IV with the rationales of other 
federal circuits.  Finally, in Part V, the constitutional justifications for 
this particular principle will be unraveled and the true motive behind the 
holding in Nielsen will be exposed. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Definition of Probable Cause 
Sixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court constructed a 
“legal definition” of probable cause in Brinegar v. United States.6  Yet 
probable cause remains an elusive concept with no applicable litmus 
test.7  Over time, the Court has sought to establish guidelines that both 
law-enforcement officers and lower courts might apply to probable-cause 
determinations.  Generally, a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment requires the issuance of a warrant based upon probable 
cause, though exceptions exist.8  In Brinegar, the Court noted that the 
probable-cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical conception,”9 that 
turns on “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
                                                     
 5. See, e.g., United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the 
smell of burnt marijuana is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the engine compartment 
of an automobile); United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that the smell of 
burnt marijuana is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the trunk of an automobile). 
 6. 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949); Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth 
Amendment: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22, 23 n.2 (2008). 
 7. Corr, supra note 1, at 17. 
 8. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth 
Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 584 (2008) (“The Justices [of the United States 
Supreme Court] have concluded that the Fourth Amendment demonstrates a ‘strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.’”  However, the Justices have found “‘a few limited 
exceptions to this general rule.’” (citations omitted)). 
 9. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176. 
0.6.0_BENDER FINAL 2/23/2010  7:58:05 PM 
2010] WHAT’S THAT SMELL? 703 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”10  
Throughout early case law, the Court consistently characterized probable 
cause as a determination based upon the information “within the 
knowledge of the officer.”11 
Armed with these rather vague standards, lower courts struggled 
with their application to similar yet subtly different fact patterns, 
specifically when officers relied on information provided by third-party 
informants.  In response, the Supreme Court adopted the Aguilar12-
Spinelli13 test, which laid out two basic requirements for an individual 
seeking a warrant: he must (1) reveal his “basis of knowledge”—how he 
came into possession of the information; and (2) demonstrate facts 
sufficient to establish the “veracity” of his claims.14  Aguilar-Spinelli 
provided a rigorous approach for obtaining a warrant.15 
A decade later in Illinois v. Gates,16 the Court rejected the strict 
structure of Aguilar-Spinelli.17  It reasoned that probable-cause 
determinations are better suited by use of a flexible approach rather than 
a rigid framework.18  The Court harked back to the probable-cause 
principles set forth in Brinegar: “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”19  The 
Court held that each case must be determined by examining the “totality 
of the circumstances” from the standpoint of a reasonable law-
enforcement officer.20  Those circumstances must be considered with 
                                                     
 10. Id. at 175. 
 11. Peter Erlinder, Florida v. J.L.—Withdrawing Permission to “Lie with Impunity”: The 
Demise of “Truly Anonymous” Informants and the Resurrection of the Aguilar/Spinelli Test for 
Probable Cause, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 41 (2002). 
 12. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983). 
 13. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1969), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983). 
 14. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional 
Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 241–42 (2008). 
 15. David E. Steinberg, Probable Cause, Reasonableness, and the Importance of Fourth 
Amendment History: A Response to Professor Arcila, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1211, 1216 (2008). 
 16. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 17. Id. at 238; Salas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the 
Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 96 (1985). 
 18. Chris Hutton, The Landscape of Search and Seizure: Observations on Recent Decisions 
From the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 51 S.D. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (2006). 
 19. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. 
 20. Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of 
Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed 
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 288 (2003). 
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regard and deference to the officer’s training and experience.21  
Essentially, probable cause becomes a matter of probabilities.22  In the 
end, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”23 
B.  Establishing Probable Cause Through the Odor of Narcotics 
Although probable cause cannot be reduced to a rigorous set of 
standards and benchmarks, the Supreme Court has a long history of 
permitting the distinctive odor of narcotics or other contraband to 
establish probable cause sufficient to issue a warrant.24 
1.  Taylor v. United States 
The prohibition era produced Taylor v. United States, one of the 
earliest Supreme Court cases to hold that the mere odor of illegal 
substances can provide probable cause sufficient for a warrant to search 
private property.25  During an extensive investigation of a house that 
received numerous “complaints”26 over a year period, prohibition agents 
recognized the distinct odor of whiskey emanating from inside the 
garage.27  Without a warrant, the agents broke the door of the garage, 
entered, and found alcohol.28  In overturning the subsequent conviction, 
the Court held that “[p]rohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor 
as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does 
not strip the owner of a building of constitutional guaranties . . . against 
unreasonable search.”29  The Court concluded that the odor of whiskey  
 
                                                     
 21. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 699–700 (1996)). 
 22. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
 23. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 24. See Robert Fraser Miller, “I Want To Stop This Guy!” Some “Touchy” Issues Arising From 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 71 N.D. L. REV. 211, 225 (1995). 
 25. 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932). 
 26. The Court failed to elaborate about what constituted a “complaint.”  Id. at 5–6.  However, 
when read in context with the background of the case, it can be inferred that the “complaints” 
involved allegations that Taylor used his premises as a distillery. 
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
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provided sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant; but because the 
agents failed to obtain one, they violated the Fourth Amendment.30 
2.  Johnson v. United States 
Over a decade later, another defendant sought the suppression of 
evidence under the Taylor analysis in Johnson v. United States.31  Based 
upon a confidential informant’s tip that “unknown persons were smoking 
opium,” federal narcotics agents positioned themselves outside defendant 
Johnson’s hotel room.32  They immediately recognized a “strong odor of 
burning opium which to them was distinctive and unmistakable.”33  
Without any additional knowledge about the occupants, the law-
enforcement officers knocked and when Johnson opened the door, they 
placed her under arrest and searched the hotel room, which turned up 
narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia.34 
Johnson’s appeal “erroneously” contended that, based on Taylor v. 
United States, “odors cannot be evidence sufficient to constitute 
probable” cause.35  Erroneous, as the Court noted, because the Taylor 
decision “held only that odors alone do not authorize a search without [a] 
warrant.”36  Despite the clear factual basis of probable cause, the Court 
reversed Johnson’s conviction due to the officers’ failure to secure a 
proper warrant, which made their search of the hotel room and arrest of 
Johnson unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.37  With this 
decision, the Court settled the debate on whether odor constitutes 
sufficient evidence for probable cause, stating: 
If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds 
the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently 
distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held 
such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant.  Indeed 
it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive 
character.38 
                                                     
 30. Id. 
 31. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 32. Id. at 12. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 13. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 15–16; James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth 
Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1842 n.115 (2008). 
 38. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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Under Johnson and Taylor, the recognition of a distinctive odor 
alone provides a sufficient probable-cause basis for a magistrate to issue 
a search warrant. 
C.  Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.39  However, 
there are a number of “specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions” to this rule.40  One long standing exception is for 
automobiles.41  Carroll v. United States held that “automobile[s] or other 
vehicle[s] may be searched” by law enforcement officers “without a 
warrant.”42  In Carroll, the Court based its decision, in part, on a 
historical understanding of the need for a search warrant.  At the time of 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, Congress recognized 
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or 
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may 
be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile 
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, 
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.43 
Yet, the Carroll decision placed limits on law enforcement’s exercise of 
the automobile exception: (1) “In cases where the securing of a warrant 
is reasonably practicable, it must be used”44 and, (2) when securing a 
warrant is not practicable, officers must still demonstrate to the court the 
requisite level of probable cause needed to obtain a warrant.45 
Though Carroll created the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, it failed to sufficiently delineate the scope of a permissible 
search under the automobile exception.46  Clarification came in United 
                                                     
 39. David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment 
History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 231 (2005) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 
(1984)). 
 40. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967)). 
 41. Thomas B. McAffee et al., The Automobile Exception in Nevada: A Critique of the 
Harnisch Cases, 8 NEV. L.J. 622, 623 (2008) (“Well over seventy-five years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (citing Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925))). 
 42. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 156. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See George M. Dery III, Improbable Cause: The Court’s Purposeful Evasion of a 
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States v. Ross, where the Court held that law enforcement “may conduct 
a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize 
in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to be searched.’”47  In 
Ross, a law-enforcement officer received a detailed tip from a reliable 
informant regarding an individual dealing drugs out of an automobile.48  
Acting on that tip, detectives encountered a man whose appearance and 
automobile matched the description provided.49  The officers stopped the 
vehicle and immediately searched it after noticing a bullet on the front 
seat.50  The search revealed a handgun in the glove compartment and 
heroin in a brown paper bag.51  A more thorough search at the police 
station uncovered a large amount of cash in a zippered bag located in the 
trunk.52 
On appeal, Ross challenged the warrantless search of the containers 
within his automobile.53  Relying on United States v. Chadwick54 and 
Arkansas v. Sanders,55 the D.C. Circuit reversed the conviction, 
concluding it was unreasonable for police to open containers found in the 
trunk without a warrant.56  The Supreme Court disagreed and 
distinguished both Chadwick and Sanders because in neither case “did 
the police have probable cause to search the vehicle or anything within 
it” except the luggage in question.57  Thus, neither Chadwick nor Sanders 
is an “automobile case”58 and they do not limit the scope of the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.59 
The Court used the Ross decision to evaluate the scope of a 
warrantless search of the compartments and containers of an automobile.  
Carroll, it noted, “‘merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant,’”60 but 
did not adjust the scope of a search based on probable cause: 
                                                                                                                       
Traditional Fourth Amendment Protection in Wyoming v. Houghton, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 547, 
552 (2000) (“[A]t this early stage in automobile exception jurisprudence, the Court had not yet 
considered the ultimate scope of the police search power in automobile exception cases.”). 
 47. 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 801. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 801–02. 
 54. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 55. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
 56. Ross, 456 U.S. at 803. 
 57. Id. at 813–14. 
 58. Id. at 816 (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 435 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 59. Id. at  813–14. 
 60. Id. at 820 (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959)). 
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A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of 
the vehicle that might contain the object of the search. When a 
legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have 
been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and 
containers, in the case of the home, or between glove compartments, 
upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient 
completion of the task at hand.61 
Therefore, a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable 
cause justifies a search to the extent allowed by a warrant.  In conclusion, 
the Court stated, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully 
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its 
contents that may conceal the object of the search.”62  The Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Ross is particularly relevant to the discussion of 
the sufficiency of marijuana odor to establish probable cause because it 
suggests there is no limit to a permissible search of an automobile.  
However, relying on Ross, the Tenth Circuit counter-intuitively limited 
the scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause derived from 
the odor of burnt marijuana to certain parts of a vehicle.63 
D.  The Odor of Marijuana as Probable Cause 
1. Raw Marijuana 
With the strong precedent of Johnson (opium) and Taylor (alcohol), 
the Supreme Court had no trouble extending the doctrine to other 
narcotics, including marijuana.  Directly on point is United States v. 
Johns,64 where the Court expressly stated: “After the officers came closer 
and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had probable cause to 
believe that the vehicles contained contraband.”65  Johns dealt with 
federal agents investigating a smuggling ring and their ability to detect 
the odor of raw marijuana.66  As such, most jurisdictions recognize that 
probable cause may be established by the detection of the odor of 
marijuana by a trained police officer.67 
                                                     
 61. Id. at 821 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 825 (emphasis added). 
 63. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 64. 469 U.S. 478 (1985). 
 65. Id. at 482. 
 66. Id. at 480–81. 
 67. John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 85 (1982). 
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2.  Burnt Marijuana 
The use of marijuana smoke as probable cause for an automobile 
search first appeared in Robbins v. California.68  Highway patrol officers 
stopped a station wagon for erratic driving and, when the defendant 
opened the door, the officers smelled marijuana smoke.69  Based on that 
observation, the officers searched the driver and the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, and found an unspecified amount of 
marijuana.70  They then opened the back hatch of the station wagon and 
discovered two opaque packages; the officers unwrapped the packages 
and found marijuana.71  The Supreme Court overturned the subsequent 
conviction, holding that the officers needed a warrant to open the 
containers found in the vehicle.72  Nevertheless, the Court found the 
initial search of the station wagon, based upon the smell of burnt 
marijuana, to be “lawful.”73  United States v. Ross, decided one year 
later, reversed Robbins, finding that when lawfully searching an 
automobile, any containers within the automobile may be legally 
searched if probable cause supports a belief that the container contains 
contraband.74  Even after Ross cast doubt on the holding, Robbins can 
arguably be viewed as valid authority for permitting probable-cause 
determinations based solely upon the smell of marijuana smoke because 
the Ross opinion only addressed the issue of searching closed containers 
and not the underlying probable cause.75 
E.  Odor of Burnt Marijuana as Probable Cause—Universal Acceptance 
Based on the principles set forth in Robbins, the odor of burnt 
marijuana became a sufficient benchmark for a probable-cause 
determination in lower courts.  A minority of the state courts that have 
considered the issue still refuse to adopt this position.76  The Third 
                                                     
 68. 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 69. Id. at 422. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 428–29. 
 73. Id. at 428 (noting that the search was “lawful” without discussing what specifically gave 
probable cause). 
 74. 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982). 
 75. See id.; United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 21 (1997) (“The Robbins Court, however, did 
not question the officers’ authority to open the station wagon’s luggage compartment in the first 
place.”). 
 76. See State v. Schmadeka, 38 P.3d 633, 638 ((Id. App. 2001) (“Thus we conclude . . . that the 
odor of burnt marijuana alone, when recognized by a person or canine qualified to recognize the 
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Circuit recently affirmed this principle declaring: “It is well settled that 
the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized, may 
establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.”77  While 
this broad statement potentially covers all forms of marijuana, in this 
particular case the Third Circuit referred specifically to probable cause 
established when an officer smelled marijuana smoke.78  Several other 
circuits expressly stated a similar conclusion.79  As a practical matter, 
courts tend not to specifically distinguish between burnt and raw 
marijuana.80  Both indicate the presence of contraband or illegal activity.  
Either way, the distinct odor of marijuana establishes probable cause. 
III.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURNT VERSUS RAW MARIJUANA 
DISTINCTION WITHIN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
The Tenth Circuit established a “common-sense” distinction between 
the permissible scope of a warrantless search when probable cause is 
based on the odor of burnt versus raw marijuana.81  The smell of burnt 
marijuana provides justification only for a search of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, but if an officer detects the odor of raw 
marijuana, he or she may permissibly search the trunk of the vehicle as 
well.82  Only if corroborating evidence develops upon search of the 
passenger compartment combined with the smell of burnt marijuana is 
there justification to search the trunk according to the Tenth Circuit.83  
Corroborating evidence would include any amount of narcotics or related 
paraphernalia. 
                                                                                                                       
odor, is only sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the portion of the 
automobile associated with that odor.”); Ronald Richards, Note, The Nose Knows the Legal 
Accuracy of the Nose: People v. Taylor, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 323, 338–40 (1999) (“Montana is 
the only state [of the thirty states analyzed] that has consistently held that the odor of burned 
marijuana, by itself, is insufficient for probable cause to search a vehicle.” (emphasis added)).  But 
see People v. Hilber, 269 N.W.2d 159, 166 (Mich. 1978) (“We conclude that the odor of smoked 
marijuana does not provide probable cause for a search of an automobile . . . .”), abrogated by 
People v. Kazmierczak, 607 N.W.2d 667, 675 n.13 (Mich. 2000). 
 77. United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 78. Id. at 306 (“Officer Huertas [] testified that when he got to within three to four feet of the 
passenger side of the Honda, he smelled ‘marijuana smoke’ through his open window.”). 
 79. Richards, supra note 76, at 338 (“Additionally, courts in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits have ‘expressly held that the smell of burnt marijuana alone is probable cause for a 
warrantless search of a motor vehicle.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 80. See id. (“Moreover, the Sixth and Seventh Circuit [sic] have made similar holdings, without 
distinguishing ‘between the odors of burnt, burning, or unburned marijuana.’” (citations omitted)). 
 81. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 82. Id. at 1228. 
 83. Id. at 1226; Brett Geiger, Comment, People v. Caballes: An Analysis of Caballes, the 
History of Sniff Search Jurisprudence, and its Future Impact, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 595, 612 (2006). 
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Although more recent case law establishes this distinction as a bright 
line rule,84 the rule actually developed slowly.  In fact, the Eighth Circuit 
interpreted an early Tenth Circuit decision as standing for the proposition 
that the smell of burnt marijuana alone provides probable cause for a 
warrantless search of a vehicle.85  A later Eighth Circuit case, relying 
upon that precedent, stated the smell of burnt marijuana provides 
probable cause to search the “entire vehicle.”86  As discussed below, the 
discrepancy results from a differing application of Ross.  Often, Ross is 
viewed as expanding upon the permissible scope of a search under the 
automobile exception.87  Instead, the Tenth Circuit, determined to derive 
a particular outcome, sought to bolster its decision with Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence by using Ross as a way to narrow the 
permissible scope of a search.  Understanding the legal reasoning behind 
the Tenth Circuit’s current bright line rule requires a thorough review of 
the rule’s history. 
A.  The Beginning 
It is undisputed in the Tenth Circuit that the odor of marijuana alone 
can establish probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle.88  This 
rule is not surprising in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Taylor 
and Johnson.  The Tenth Circuit diverges from other federal circuits, 
however, on which areas of an automobile may be searched without a 
warrant once an officer smells burnt marijuana.  Beginning with United 
                                                     
 84. See Wald, 216 F.3d at 1226 (“[A]lthough the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a 
vehicle provides probable cause to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle . . . probable 
cause to search the trunk of the vehicle does not exist.”); United States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 
1303 (10th Cir. 1998) (Based on the smell of burnt marijuana, “there is no fair probability that the 
trunk of the car contains marijuana and an officer must limit the search to the passenger 
compartment.”). 
 85. See United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Many lower courts have 
relied primarily upon the odor of marijuana in determining that probable cause existed for a 
warrantless automobile search.”) (citing United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986) (The 
officer smelled “what he thought was still-burning marijuana.”)). 
 86. United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 87. Edwin Butterfoss, As Time Goes By: The Elimination of Contemporaneity and Brevity as 
Factors in Search and Seizure Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 603, 618 (1986); A. Michael 
Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 709, 872–73 n.716 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and 
the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 
131–33 (1983). 
 88. See United States v Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he odor of marijuana 
alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.”); United States v. 
Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Once the agent smelled the marijuana, he was 
certainly justified in the search of the entire truck.”). 
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States v. Loucks, the Tenth Circuit upheld a search of an automobile 
based solely on the officer’s recognition of the odor of burnt marijuana.89  
With probable cause established, the officer began a search of the 
passenger compartment, which revealed a small amount of marijuana.90  
He then opened the trunk and found an additional twenty-five pounds of 
marijuana inside a laundry bag.91  In denying the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the district court relied on United States v. Ross, invoking the 
principle that when probable cause supports the search of an automobile, 
the officer “‘may conduct a warrantless search of the car and the 
containers within it that could conceal the object of the search.’”92  The 
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision without discussion of 
whether the smell of burnt marijuana alone provided justification to 
search the trunk.93  Because the officer found corroborating evidence—
the small amount of narcotics—before searching the trunk, the Tenth 
Circuit did not specifically address whether the odor of burnt marijuana 
justified a search of the trunk. 
B.  Personal-Use Doctrine 
In Loucks, the Tenth Circuit addressed another pressing question 
relevant to this discussion.  Loucks argued that the small amount of 
marijuana found within the passenger compartment of his vehicle 
indicated personal use, not narcotics trafficking or distribution.94  
Therefore, he claimed, the presence of a small amount of narcotics 
established probable cause to search the passenger compartment, but not 
the trunk.95 
In United States v. Burnett, the Sixth Circuit addressed the same 
argument—that the small amount of marijuana found within the 
passenger compartment of his automobile indicated that the defendant 
was “only a casual user of narcotics as opposed to a dealer.”96  As a 
response, the Sixth Circuit stated that imposing such a rule 
burden[s] the police with having to make another judgment call—
whether a certain amount of marijuana, cocaine, or other drug found on 
                                                     
 89. 806 F.2d 208, 209 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 209 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)). 
 93. Id. at 211. 
 94. Id. at 210. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 791 F.2d 64, 67 (6th Cir. 1986). 
0.6.0_BENDER FINAL 2/23/2010  7:58:05 PM 
2010] WHAT’S THAT SMELL? 713 
a person or in some container makes the person a casual user or a 
dealer. Determining the existence of probable cause to search on the 
amount of contraband initially found is a line which need not and 
should not be drawn . . . .  From the long history of litigated drug cases, 
it is evident that neither the casual user nor the dealer fits any precise 
description or category.97 
In other words, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that there should 
be a distinction between casual users and narcotics traffickers when 
determining the existence of probable cause.98 
The Tenth Circuit concurred with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and 
refused to adopt a personal-use doctrine, arguing it was “illogical and 
unreasonable.”99  Other circuits have reached similar conclusions in 
refusing to adopt a personal-use doctrine.100  Despite this initial rejection 
of a rule requiring officers to make a determination between drug use and 
drug trafficking, this concept has been revived by the Tenth Circuit to 
support its distinction between burnt and raw marijuana for the purposes 
of searching an automobile.101 
C.  An Uncertain Future: How Other Courts Interpreted Loucks 
Based partially on the Loucks decision, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that burnt marijuana alone provides probable cause to search 
an automobile, without distinction between the passenger compartment 
and the trunk.102  As previously noted, other circuits and commentators 
interpreted Loucks and its progeny as permitting a warrantless search of 
an automobile’s trunk based solely on the odor of burnt marijuana.103  
                                                     
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at n.2. 
 99. Loucks, 806 F.2d at 210. 
 100. See United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Those federal courts that 
have considered the ‘personal use’ argument have rejected it . . . .”). 
 101. See United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he smell of burnt 
marijuana is indicative of drug usage, rather than drug trafficking . . . .”). 
 102. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[D]etection of the smell 
of burnt marijuana . . . gave him probable cause to search the entire vehicle for drugs.”); United 
States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e are unable to conclude that the odor of burnt 
marijuana on Cave’s breath and person, when considered in the context of the circumstances 
confronting the trooper, was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of the 
automobile.”). 
 103. See Caves, 890 F.2d at 90 (“Many lower courts have relied primarily upon the odor of 
marijuana in determining that probable cause existed for a warrantless automobile search.” 
(interpreting United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986), in which the officer smelled 
“still-burning marijuana”)); Richards, supra note 76, at 338 (The Tenth Circuit has “‘expressly held 
that the smell of burnt marijuana alone is probable cause for a warrantless search of a motor 
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Post-Loucks, other Tenth Circuit cases addressed searches of 
automobiles after the officer detected the odor of burnt marijuana, but 
those subsequent cases involved either consent or corroborating evidence 
prior to a search of the trunk.104  Then, in United States v. Nielsen,105 the 
Tenth Circuit took a large step toward establishing a distinction between 
the odors of burnt and raw marijuana. 
D.  Distinguishing Between Burnt and Raw Marijuana: United States v. 
Nielsen 
1.  Facts 
Officer Bushnell stopped the defendant’s vehicle for speeding.106  
When the officer approached the open window, he “immediately 
recognized the smell of burned marijuana” emanating either from the 
defendant or from the automobile itself.107  The defendant, Nielsen, 
consented to a search of the passenger compartment, which revealed no 
contraband of any kind.108  A routine radio check then revealed that 
Nielsen had been arrested for misdemeanor marijuana possession almost 
fifteen years prior.109  Officer Bushnell then searched the vehicle’s trunk 
without a warrant or Nielsen’s consent and discovered a set of scales and 
two kilograms of cocaine.110 
Officer Bushnell’s search uncovered neither evidence of marijuana 
nor any marijuana-related paraphernalia.111  In support of his motion to 
suppress the evidence uncovered in the search, Nielsen introduced “the 
negative results of a urine test that should have indicated whether he had 
used marijuana within the time frame of the stop” to refute Officer 
Bushnell’s claim that the odor of burnt marijuana was present.112  The 
district court, however, found Officer Bushnell’s testimony about the 
odor of burnt marijuana credible.113  Applying Loucks114 and Ross,115 the 
                                                                                                                       
vehicle.’” (citing United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993))). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The officer also 
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, and observed what he believed to be marijuana seeds or residue 
in the car’s interior.”). 
 105. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 106. Id. at 1488. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1489. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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court denied Nielsen’s motion to suppress, reasoning that probable cause 
permits a warrantless search of every part of a vehicle, including the 
trunk.116 
2.  Analysis 
Considering Nielsen’s appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted its obligation 
to “accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.”117  Despite this obligation, the Tenth Circuit struggled to 
reconcile the fact pattern presented: 
The rational explanations for these incongruous facts suggest the 
following possibilities: (1) Bushnell did smell marijuana—someone 
else had recently smoked marijuana in defendant’s car, or, less likely, 
defendant had smoked marijuana in the car, disposed the remains out 
the window, and the urine test result was invalid; (2) Bushnell thought 
he smelled marijuana, but was mistaken; or (3) Bushnell fabricated his 
testimony that he detected the smell of marijuana. The district court 
believed the officer’s testimony, thus, apparently it accepted the first 
possibility. Based upon the cold record we would not have made the 
same determination; but, as is the case with essentially all factual 
findings based upon credibility, we cannot hold that the district court’s 
factual finding is clearly erroneous.118 
While the Tenth Circuit purported to accept the district court’s factual 
findings, it expressly rejected the lower court’s legal analysis. 
The court distinguished both Loucks and United States v. Ashby,119 
another Tenth Circuit case where an officer used the smell of burnt 
marijuana as probable cause to search an automobile,120 “because in 
those cases the officers not only detected the odor of burnt marijuana, 
they also found marijuana in the passenger compartment before 
searching the trunk.”121  Unlike the district court, the Tenth Circuit 
viewed Ross as limiting the scope of a warrantless search to “the places 
                                                                                                                       
 114. 806 F.2d 208, 209 (10th Cir. 1986) (Where “an officer legitimately stops a car, and has 
probable cause to believe drugs are concealed in that car, he may conduct a warrantless search of the 
car and the containers within it that could conceal the object of the search.”). 
 115. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object 
of that search.”). 
 116. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1489. 
 117. Id. (citing United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 118. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 119. 864 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 120. Id. at 692. 
 121. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1490. 
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in which there is probable cause to believe that [the object of the search] 
may be found.”122  Therefore, it concluded that an odor of burnt 
marijuana suggests only that “the passenger compartment might contain 
marijuana,” and does not establish a “fair probability that the trunk 
[might] contain[] marijuana.”123  The decision went so far as to conclude 
that, based solely upon the odor of burnt marijuana, no disinterested 
magistrate would issue a search warrant for anything other than the 
passenger compartment.124 
As further support for its distinction, the Tenth Circuit turned to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Acevedo,125 stating that “if the 
object of the search is a paper bag of marijuana in the trunk, and police 
do not have probable cause to believe the object of the search is hidden 
elsewhere, a search of the entire vehicle would be unreasonable.”126  
Acevedo, the Tenth Circuit determined, reaffirmed the limiting nature of 
the rule provided by Ross.127  After applying Ross, the Tenth Circuit 
overturned the district court’s denial of Nielsen’s motion to suppress.128 
E.  The Aftermath: Further Developments in the Nielsen Progeny 
In the wake of Nielsen, the Tenth Circuit continued to apply its 
holding without further analysis or justification for the clear distinction 
between burnt and raw marijuana.129  Not until United States v. Downs130 
did the Tenth Circuit elaborate on its strikingly unique rationale.  In 
Downs, the Tenth Circuit “recognize[d] that the smell of burnt marijuana 
is generally consistent with personal use of marijuana in the passenger 
compartment,” whereas if the odor is of raw marijuana, “there is a fair 
probability that the car is being used to transport large quantities of 
marijuana and that the marijuana has been secreted in places other than 
the passenger compartment.”131 
                                                     
 122. Id. at 1491 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 126. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The odor of marijuana 
in the passenger compartment of a vehicle does not, however, standing alone, establish probable 
cause to search the trunk of the vehicle.”) (citing Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491). 
 130. 151 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 131. Id. at 1303. 
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The holding in Downs reopened the issue of whether to distinguish 
between the presence of narcotics that indicates personal use and that 
which indicates trafficking.  Finally, in United States v. Wald,132 the 
Tenth Circuit solidified this distinction: 
This rule is premised on the common-sense proposition that the smell 
of burnt marijuana is indicative of drug usage, rather than drug 
trafficking, and because it is unreasonable to believe people smoke 
marijuana in the trunks of cars, the mere smell of burnt marijuana does 
not create the fair probability that the trunk contains marijuana.133 
 
Wald dealt with the odor of burnt methamphetamine rather than 
marijuana,134 but the same principles set forth in Nielsen, Parker, and 
Downs applied.  Despite the Tenth Circuit’s early reluctance to establish 
a personal-use doctrine to limit the permissible scope of an automobile 
search when small amounts of narcotics are discovered,135 almost two 
decades later, the Tenth Circuit had no hesitation in applying a personal-
use limit to probable cause established by the distinctive odor of 
narcotics. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE: HOW OTHER CIRCUITS REACHED A 
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION 
In rendering its judgment in Nielsen, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
that at least one other circuit potentially disagreed with its holding: “The 
only other case we have uncovered finding probable cause when the 
smell was not corroborated by the search was United States v. 
Reed . . . .”136  Reed involved a search of a locked compartment within an 
automobile based on nothing but the officer’s detection of the odor of 
burnt marijuana.137  That search did not reveal any evidence of marijuana 
or related paraphernalia;138 yet, the Fifth Circuit found the search to be 
reasonable.139  It reasoned that officers recognized “the distinct odor of 
burnt marihuana, and this in itself would have justified the subsequent 
                                                     
 132. 208 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 133. Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. at 904. 
 135. United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 210–11 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a personal-use 
theory for drugs discovered in the passenger compartment of an automobile). 
 136. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 137. United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 138. The search did reveal over four pounds of cocaine.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 148–49. 
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search of Reed’s vehicle. . . . including the locked compartment that was 
a likely place to conceal contraband.”140  The court also noted that “[i]t is 
not controlling that the substance eventually discovered in the vehicle 
was cocaine, and that no marihuana was ever found.  It is settled that the 
presence or absence of probable cause to search is not determined by 
what the search does or does not ultimately reveal.”141 
Although acknowledging the contradictory holding in Reed, the 
Tenth Circuit was quick to dismiss its relevance in Nielsen.  First, it 
reasoned that in Reed the police located the locked compartment in 
question within the passenger compartment of the automobile, not the 
trunk.142  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s holding fit within the distinction 
between a trunk and a passenger compartment drawn by the Tenth 
Circuit in Nielsen.  Next, because the Fifth Circuit used broad language 
in defining the scope of the search, it never actually stated whether a 
search of the trunk was permissible under the probable cause 
established.143  Finally, even if one might interpret the Reed decision as a 
direct contradiction to the principles of Nielsen, a Fifth Circuit case is not 
controlling within the Tenth Circuit.  No obligation exists to follow, or 
even consider, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusions.  Despite the attempt by the 
Tenth Circuit to reconcile its holding in Nielsen with the holding of 
Reed, other circuits, including the Fifth, continued to disagree with the 
distinction between burnt and raw marijuana. 
A.  The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit’s marquee case, in direct contradiction to the Tenth 
Circuit’s burnt versus raw distinction, is United States v. McSween.144  
The facts involved a traffic stop of the defendant during which Officers 
Billings and Price obtained consent from the defendant to search the 
passenger compartment and trunk.145  Officer Billings opened the trunk 
and the defendant helped him remove the interior panels.146  Meanwhile, 
Officer Price ran a background check and then searched the passenger 
                                                     
 140. Id. at 149. 
 141. Id. 
 142. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 143. Id. (“The court there [in Reed] declared that the odor of marijuana alone justified a search 
of the entire vehicle . . . .”). 
 144. 53 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 145. Id. at 685.  The opinion does not note why officers initially wanted to search the vehicle, 
other than the fact that officers “[n]otice[d] a cellular phone and radar detector in the car’s 
interior . . . .”  Id. 
 146. Id. 
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area.147  This search did not reveal narcotics, but Officer Price “noticed 
the smell of burnt marihuana” while searching the passenger area.148  
Despite the lack of corroborating evidence, and without the defendant’s 
consent, Officer Price opened the hood of the vehicle and found a small 
amount of marijuana in a hole of the car’s firewall.149  A subsequent 
search at the impound lot, following the defendant’s arrest, revealed 
more marijuana and a “shoulder sling of crack cocaine.”150 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s argument 
that even if the odor of marijuana provided sufficient probable cause for 
a warrantless search, the scope of the intrusion should have been 
restricted to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, because that was 
the detected origin of the odor.151  The smell of marijuana as sufficient 
grounds for a finding of probable cause is firmly established in the Fifth 
Circuit.152  With probable cause established, an application of Ross 
supported the actions of Officer Price: 
It is well settled that, in a case such as this, the detection of the odor of 
marihuana justifies “a search of the entire vehicle.” . . . [I]f there is 
probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains contraband, then the 
search may extend not only to closed containers, but also to a “car’s 
trunk or glove compartment.”  The same reasoning applies to the area 
under the hood, where drugs may also be concealed.153 
Under this rationale, the smell of burnt marijuana in the passenger 
compartment established probable cause to commence a search of every 
part of the vehicle, including the trunk, or as in this case, the engine 
compartment.  To put it another way, the holding permits a search for 
“every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of 
the search.”154  This holding applied Ross in a less limiting fashion than 
the Tenth Circuit did in Nielsen. 
                                                     
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 685–86. 
 151. Id. at 687. 
 152. Id. at 686–87. 
 153. Id. at 687 (citing United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982)). 
 154. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). 
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B.  The Eighth Circuit 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s 
distinction between the odors of burnt and raw marijuana.  An analysis of 
Eighth Circuit jurisprudence begins with United States v. Caves.155  
When the defendant was stopped for speeding, he immediately exited his 
vehicle and approached the officer’s patrol car.156  Subsequent discussion 
regarding the speeding violation took place within the patrol car.157  
During this conversation, the officer noticed an “intense odor of burnt 
marijuana on Caves’s person and breath” and advised the defendant that 
he would be conducting a search of the defendant’s vehicle.158  On 
appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the search even though the officer 
failed to detect the odor emanating from a vehicle: 
Although the odor of burnt marijuana on the driver alone is 
undoubtedly less probative of the existence of unused marijuana in the 
automobile than would be the odor of unburnt marijuana emanating 
from both the driver and the vehicle, we are unable to conclude that the 
odor of burnt marijuana on Caves’s breath and person, when considered 
in the context of the circumstances confronting the trooper, was 
insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of the 
automobile.159 
In Caves, the probable cause determination was based not on the 
vehicle itself but on a recent occupant.  As expressed in Brinegar, 
probable cause is a matter of probabilities.160  Without excluding the 
possibility that the defendant had potentially smoked marijuana at an 
undisclosed location prior to entering the vehicle, the Eighth Circuit 
found that the automobile was a probable location where the defendant, 
or his passenger, smoked marijuana.161  Therefore, probable cause 
existed to search the vehicle. 
While the Eighth Circuit never expressly stated that a search of the 
trunk was permissible based on the odor of burnt marijuana alone,162 later 
                                                     
 155. 890 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 156. Id. at 88. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 91. 
 160. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (“In dealing with probable cause . . . 
we deal with probabilities.”). 
 161. Caves, 890 F.2d at 91. 
 162. In Caves, the search of the trunk took place after the officer found two plastic bags of 
marijuana within the passenger compartment.  Id. at 89.  The subsequent search of the trunk fits 
within the rule propagated by the Tenth Circuit in Nielsen.  See supra notes 123 and 124 and 
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case law clarified the intent of the Eighth Circuit.  In United States v. 
Neumann, the Eighth Circuit stated that an officer’s “detection of the 
smell of burnt marijuana . . . gave him probable cause to search the entire 
vehicle for drugs.”163  The Neumann decision lacks any requirement for 
corroborating evidence.  Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that probable cause to search the vehicle includes every part 
of the vehicle, not simply the area of the vehicle in which the odor was 
detected. 
The Fifth and Eighth Circuit applied the principles of Ross in a 
manner that expanded, rather than limited, the permissible scope of a 
warrantless search of an automobile.  Both circuits concluded that under 
Ross, once officers established probable cause on a vehicle, they were 
authorized to search the entire vehicle.  Effectively, the permissible 
scope of a search was an all or nothing proposition.  Since the odor of 
burnt marijuana was sufficient probable cause, nothing under Ross 
requires the officers to limit their search to the passenger compartment. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit is the only federal circuit to adopt a standard that 
permits a search of the entire vehicle when an officer recognizes the 
smell of raw marijuana but simultaneously prohibits a search of any part 
of the vehicle other than the passenger compartment if the officer instead 
smells burnt marijuana.164  A close reading of Nielsen and its progeny 
suggests that the black letter rule outlined in Wald is not the product of 
legal reasoning and precedent based on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, but rather the Nielsen Court’s determination that a law 
enforcement officer manufactured testimony to legitimize his otherwise 
illegal search.  With the Nielsen decision in place, the Tenth Circuit 
eventually solidified a framework and developed logic based on 
constitutional principles to support its conclusions.  The rule that 
developed within the Tenth Circuit is, therefore, the product of result-
driven analysis—legal reasoning adopted to justify a pre-determined 
outcome.  As support for this argument, this Comment will address: (1) 
                                                                                                                       
accompanying text. 
 163. United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (citing 
Caves, 890 F.2d at 90). 
 164. A minority of state court decisions also refused to uphold probable cause on the trunk of a 
vehicle if based solely upon an officer recognizing the odor of burnt marijuana.  See sources cited 
supra note 76.  But see Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 280 (Colo. 1999) (“[T]he smell of burning 
marijuana may give an officer probable cause to search or arrest.” (citing People v. Baker, 813 P.2d 
331, 333 (Colo. 1991))). 
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the Tenth Circuit’s faulty analysis of Ross, (2) why Nielsen and its 
progeny erroneously rest upon the failed and often-rejected personal use 
doctrine, and (3) an alternative rationale behind the Nielsen decision.  
Additionally, the Comment argues that the rule outlined by the Tenth 
Circuit in Nielsen and its progeny does little to protect the rights of 
individuals and concludes that this rule should be discarded. 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Faulty Interpretation of Ross 
Well after the ruling in Nielsen, the Tenth Circuit developed a more 
complex and rigid legal framework as continued support for its Nielsen 
progeny.  But to lay a foundation for its original holding, the Tenth 
Circuit needed favorable Fourth Amendment precedent.  The Tenth 
Circuit turned to the principles asserted in Ross. 
1. United States v. Ross: Broadening the Permissible Scope of a 
Warrantless Search Under the Automobile Exception 
Originally, the rationale of the motor-vehicle exception to the 
warrant requirement was based upon the “inherent mobility” of an 
automobile, a valid exigency that supports the exception.165  However, 
over the years, the Court has framed the automobile exception solely as a 
matter of probable cause, without mentioning the underlying exigencies 
which gave rise to the exception in the first place.166  By the time Ross 
was decided, the Court had established one set of rules for an automobile 
and another for the containers located within the automobile.167 
Ross provided the Court an opportunity to reevaluate the permissible 
scope of the warrantless search of an automobile and simplify this area of 
law by providing bright-line rules for police.168  In doing so, the Court 
intended to expand, rather than limit—as suggested by the Tenth 
Circuit—the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search to 
                                                     
 165. Clymer, supra note 87, at 114–15. 
 166. See id. at 114 (citing Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam)). 
 167. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979) (requiring law enforcement to 
obtain a warrant before searching containers found within an automobile), abrogated by California 
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1977) (holding 
that luggage or other containers seized and under the exclusive control of law enforcement may not 
be searched without a warrant), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146–47 (1925) (establishing an exception to the warrant requirement 
for automobiles). 
 168. Clymer, supra note 87, at 106. 
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include all containers and compartments.169  The Court noted that 
because criminals typically conceal contraband in containers, “the 
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be largely nullified 
if the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile did not 
include containers and packages found inside the vehicle.”170  Ross, 
therefore, stands for the proposition that probable cause to search any 
part of an automobile grants law enforcement justification for searching 
every part of the vehicle.171  As a practical matter, the Court appears to 
be unwilling to place any limitations on the scope of the automobile 
exception.172  However, the Court indicated that if probable cause exists 
solely for a particular container within an automobile, but not for the 
automobile itself, then perhaps the broad scope established in Ross might 
fail to apply.173  That exact fact scenario was presented in California v. 
Acevedo.174 
Despite the broad scope of a warrantless search permissible under 
the automobile exception pronounced in Ross, the Tenth Circuit managed 
to derive a contradictory conclusion.  By viewing Ross through the lens 
of Acevedo, the Tenth Circuit decided that the limited holding of 
Acevedo represented a further limitation on searches permitted by Ross, 
rather than viewing it as the exception to the rule foreseen by the Ross 
decision.  As a result of that analysis, the Tenth Circuit found Ross to 
stand for different principles than those determined by other circuits.  
The probable cause established in Acevedo extended solely to a particular 
container known to be in Acevedo’s car.175  Therefore, the Court 
reasoned, the justifiable scope of the subsequent search extended only to 
that container.176  Based upon this dictum, Nielsen concluded that 
Acevedo reaffirmed the idea that Ross severely limits the areas of a 
vehicle that might be the object of a warrantless search.177  Essentially, 
the Nielsen analysis suggests that Ross requires law enforcement to 
establish probable cause for each individual section of an automobile (i.e. 
the passenger compartment, trunk, engine, etc.).178  In reaching this 
                                                     
 169. See id. at 134–35. 
 170. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982). 
 171. Id. at 821–22. 
 172. Clymer, supra note 87, at 132. 
 173. William M. Phillips, Comment, Toward a Functional Fourth Amendment Approach to 
Automobile Search and Seizure Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 861, 864 (1982). 
 174. 500 U.S. 565, 567, 572–73 (1991). 
 175. Id. at 572–73. 
 176. Id. at 580. 
 177. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 178. Id. 
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restrictive conclusion, the Tenth Circuit was quick to distinguish two of 
its own previous cases, Ashby and Loucks, which arguably stand for a 
contradictory proposition.179  Both Ashby and Loucks state, without 
qualification or explanation, that “[o]nce probable cause exists for a 
search, the police have authority to search the entire vehicle.”180  This 
language suggests there is no independent probable-cause requirement 
before a search of a trunk is valid. 
2. Why Acevedo Fails to Alter the Ross Analysis 
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s assertion that Acevedo reinforces the 
limiting nature of Ross, the Acevedo decision in fact expands the 
permissible scope of a warrantless search involving an automobile.  The 
decision further “demonstrates the Court’s increasing emphasis on law 
enforcement efficiency and evidence preservation rather than 
exigency.”181  Additionally, the Tenth Circuit either failed to realize or, 
more likely, ignored the fact that Acevedo should clearly be distinguished 
from the Ross holding.  Acevedo is factually similar to Chadwick and 
Sanders—decided pre-Ross—in which the Supreme Court announced 
that if law enforcement established probable cause that bags or luggage 
conceal contraband, then it is impermissible for officers to wait until the 
container is loaded into an automobile in order to apply the automobile 
exception for a warrantless search of the container.182  As Chadwick and 
Sanders indicate, the Court drew a distinction between probable cause 
for an automobile and probable cause for a container that was 
subsequently placed into an automobile.183  Similarly, in Acevedo, law-
enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that only a particular 
object contained contraband rather than the automobile in which it was 
contained.184  Acevedo eradicated this distinction and potentially opens 
the door for law-enforcement officers to establish probable cause for a 
particular container and use that as an excuse to search an individual’s 
entire vehicle.185  Under that particular set of circumstances, the Court 
                                                     
 179. Id. at 1490. 
 180. United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Loucks, 
806 F.2d 208, 209 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
 181. Shaela Ann McNulty, Comment, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment Protection on 
the Wane—California v. Acevedo, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 248, 257 (1992). 
 182. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 571–72 (1991). 
 183. Id. at 580. 
 184. Id. at 567–68. 
 185. Id. at 580 (“Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an 
automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally 
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announced that the permissible scope of the search is properly limited 
only to that container because probable cause existed prior to the 
involvement of an automobile.186 
That analysis is not applicable to the current situation because 
Acevedo failed to alter the Ross analysis.187  The Supreme Court in 
Acevedo correctly defined the scope of a warrantless search as being 
limited to those objects for which law enforcement can establish 
probable cause.  But in Nielsen the Tenth Circuit incorrectly interpreted 
that notion as applying to the various parts of a vehicle as separate 
distinguishable objects which each receive an individualized probable-
cause analysis.  However, as demonstrated in Ross, an automobile may 
be considered a single object and therefore a probable-cause 
determination may be made on the vehicle in its entirety, not on separate 
parts.188  The Fifth Circuit summed up the scope of a search permitted by 
Ross: 
[I]f officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is in only 
one part of a car, then they are limited to that area.  If, on the other 
hand, officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is located 
somewhere in a car, but they don’t know exactly where, then they can 
search the entire vehicle.189 
In response, the Tenth Circuit would argue that the odor of burnt 
marijuana indicates only that narcotics are present in the passenger 
compartment—nobody smokes marijuana in the trunk—and 
corroborating evidence is needed to permit a search of the trunk.190  As 
shown infra, this narrow viewpoint runs contrary to the reality of 
narcotics cases. 
More importantly, though, a closer reading of the particular language 
used by the Fifth Circuit to summarize Ross undermines the Tenth 
Circuit’s argument.  The phrase, “is in only one part,” suggests that law 
enforcement is limited when the circumstances demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                                       
turns up in an automobile.  The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such 
coincidences.” (emphasis added)). 
 186. Id. at 574–76. 
 187. See id. at 580 (“Our holding today neither extends the Carroll doctrine nor broadens the 
scope of permissible automobile search delineated in Carroll, Chambers, and Ross.”). 
 188. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823–24 (1982). 
 189. United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993).  The Nielsen Court relied 
on this opinion in making its argument against permitting a search of the trunk.  United States v. 
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993).  Ironically, the Fifth Circuit has most clearly stated its 
belief that the odor of burnt marijuana provides probable cause to search the trunk of an automobile.  
United States v. McdSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686–87 (5th Cir.) 
 190. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491. 
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particular section of the vehicle is the only possible location where 
contraband might be found, such as a situation where the officers know 
in advance that only a particular container conceals contraband.  
Otherwise, a generalized finding of probable cause on the vehicle must 
permit a search of every part that could contain the object of the search 
because there is nothing to indicate that the passenger compartment is the 
only part of the vehicle concealing contraband.  The D.C. Circuit 
proposed a similar conclusion: the facts on the record in Acevedo 
demonstrate a complete lack of probable cause for any part of the vehicle 
other than the suspected bag and, additionally, that the government failed 
to even argue that the officers had reason to suspect the presence of 
additional narcotics.191  This narrow set of circumstances created the 
limitation set forth in Acevedo and the D.C. Circuit refused to extend the 
proposed limitations to cases where probable cause was established on 
the vehicle itself.192  It continued to utilize the broad scope permitted by 
the more traditional and normative reading of Ross.193 
3. Burnt Versus Raw: Rejection of the Tenth Circuit’s Marijuana 
Distinction 
Defendants in other jurisdictions have submitted a rationale similar 
to the Tenth Circuit’s reading of Ross as support for their own motions to 
suppress.  Other federal courts have found the Tenth Circuit’s analysis 
unpersuasive.194  A district court in the Third Circuit called the logic 
“unique” and dismissed it, stating: “[That] is not the law here.”195  
Probable cause on the vehicle includes the trunk, and “[a]ny contraband 
seized as a result of the search will be admissible even if the search 
provides no additional indications of marijuana use.”196  In the First 
Circuit, a district court considered the application of Wald, where the 
Tenth Circuit invalidated a warrantless search of the engine compartment 
when probable cause was based solely upon the odor of burnt 
methamphetamine.197  The district court concluded that “[t]he court’s 
                                                     
 191. United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)). 
 192. Id. at 22–23. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 23. 
 195. United States v. Nelson, No. 06-240, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67793, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
20, 2006).  Other Third Circuit district courts have adopted the reasoning of Nelson.  United States v. 
Ushery, 526 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 196. Ushery, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03. 
 197. United States v. Pugh, 223 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (D. Me. 2002). 
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conclusion in Wald is difficult to reconcile” with earlier Tenth Circuit 
precedent and “it did not find the court’s reasoning in Wald 
persuasive.”198  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has held that a distinction 
between the odor of burnt marijuana and the odor of raw marijuana is 
insignificant in a probable-cause finding on an automobile.199  Combined 
with the contradictory opinions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, at 
least six federal courts of appeals specifically disagree with the Tenth 
Circuit’s interpretation of Acevedo, promulgated through Nielsen and its 
progeny. 
Certainly, it is within the prerogative of the Tenth Circuit to interpret 
Supreme Court decisions contrary to other circuits, but the legal 
framework established by the Tenth Circuit is the lone outlier on the 
spectrum of possible Ross interpretations.  Part of the rationale behind 
the finality of Supreme Court decisions is to assure that federal law is 
applied uniformly throughout the numerous jurisdictions of the United 
States.200  Otherwise, an individual’s constitutional rights shift depending 
on their geographic location.  As the sole federal jurisdiction to place 
such a restriction upon law enforcement, the Tenth Circuit has essentially 
hijacked this particular issue.  In fact, after the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Nielsen, the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin published an article on the 
motor-vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.  It stated, “the odor 
of burnt marijuana alone is generally not viewed by the courts as 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search the trunk of a vehicle.”201  
As support for this generality, the article references the Nielsen decision 
and cites two state supreme courts that agree with the Tenth Circuit.202  
While not an official indication of FBI policy, the purpose of the bulletin 
is to provide the law-enforcement community with guidance, tips, and 
general principles of law to apply during investigations.  By continuing 
to view Ross through this framework the Tenth Circuit altered the way in 
which this particular aspect of the Fourth Amendment is regarded and 
utilized across multiple jurisdictions. 
                                                     
 198. Id. at 331. 
 199. United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 200. See, e.g., Margaret Tarkington, Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and 
Congressional Intent After Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 59 S.C. L. REV. 225, 252 (2008) 
(“[A] primary justification for federal jurisdiction is the uniform interpretation of federal law . . . .”). 
 201. Edward Hendrie, The Motor Vehicle Exception, 74 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 22, 25 
(2005). 
 202. Id.; see also, Corr, supra note 1, at 17 (“[O]ne court has held that such an odor [of burnt 
marijuana] is not enough, when followed by a fruitless search of the passenger compartment, to 
justify a search of the trunk . . . .”). 
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The Tenth Circuit expressly permits the odor of burnt marijuana to 
establish the requisite probable cause for a warrant.  Added to a proper 
reading of Ross, the logical conclusion that follows is that the odor of 
burnt marijuana provides probable cause to search “every part of the 
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search,” 
including the trunk.203 
B.  Resurrection of the Personal-Use Doctrine 
As the previous discussion indicates, the Nielsen decision is based 
upon the Tenth Circuit’s application of Acevedo to the warrantless search 
of an automobile permitted under Ross.  However, with such a fragile 
legal framework as support for its original holding, the Tenth Circuit 
eventually expanded the arguments used to justify this rule.  Shortly after 
Nielsen, the Tenth Circuit began to add to the analytical framework for 
determining probable cause based upon the odor of marijuana.  It finally 
announced its rationale in United States v. Wald, pronouncing that “the 
smell of burnt marijuana is indicative of drug usage, rather than drug 
trafficking . . . .”204  In doing so, the Tenth Circuit took a step backward 
in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Simply stated, the Tenth Circuit 
improperly resurrected the personal-use doctrine of probable cause. 
Federal courts, however, are overwhelmingly unsympathetic to 
defendants who invoke the theory of personal use in order to obtain 
suppression.205  Drawing a distinction between the odor of burnt and raw 
marijuana is, from a practical and functional perspective, simply another 
version of the personal-use doctrine—the smell of raw marijuana 
suggests drug trafficker and burnt marijuana suggests small quantity 
user.206  Correspondingly, there exists no reason to suspect the 
automobile contains enough narcotics to rise to the level of distribution.  
Establishing this bright-line rule as to what circumstances indicate a 
narcotics trafficker as opposed to a simple user runs contrary to the 
generally accepted notion that “neither the casual user nor the dealer fits 
any precise description or category.”207 
A bright-line distinction also ignores the possibility of sophisticated 
narcotics traffickers using burnt marijuana as a masking agent for raw 
                                                     
 203. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). 
 204. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 205. See United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Those federal courts that 
have considered the ‘personal use’ argument have rejected it . . . .”). 
 206. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1226. 
 207. United States v. Burnett, 791 F.2d 64, 67 (6th Cir. 1986). 
0.6.0_BENDER FINAL 2/23/2010  7:58:05 PM 
2010] WHAT’S THAT SMELL? 729 
marijuana stored in the trunk.  This opens the door for traffickers to burn 
marijuana in the passenger compartment and then discard the 
corroborating evidence,208 knowing that contact with police could only 
result in a search of the passenger compartment.  With a lack of 
corroborating evidence, law enforcement would be forced to send the 
suspect on his way.  A counter to this contention, however, is that the 
smell of burnt marijuana provides the officer with enough reasonable 
suspicion to detain the suspect until a narcotic detecting canine could 
arrive to verify.209  But law enforcement officers need the latitude to do 
their job without such support, and canine detection is not always a 
readily available option in the field.  Additionally, this distinction 
imposes upon the officer another complicated layer of decision-
making.210  Not only must he determine whether probable cause exists, 
but the officer must then run through the analysis of which parts of the 
automobile are subject to the initial search.  Part of the rationale for 
initially rejecting the personal-use doctrine was to avoid placing such an 
undue burden upon law enforcement.211 
The argument for imposing a personal-use doctrine is not only 
unpersuasive, but is contrary to Tenth Circuit precedent.  In Loucks, the 
Tenth Circuit firmly and unequivocally rejected a distinction between a 
narcotics amount indicating personal use and one indicating drug 
trafficking.212  Neither Nielsen nor its progeny overruled this well-
established and widely-accepted principle.  Yet this reasoning—once 
rejected by the Tenth Circuit as “illogical and unreasonable”213—is now 
invoked to justify the distinction between burnt and raw marijuana. 
Wald unequivocally asserts that the burnt versus raw marijuana 
distinction is predicated upon a personal-use theory.214  The allegedly 
limiting nature of Acevedo, the key to the Nielsen decision, is now a 
secondary consideration.  Five years after overturning Nielsen’s 
conviction, the Tenth Circuit resurrected a previously discarded theory to 
support a conclusion based entirely on a credibility determination, rather 
than a sound analysis of Fourth Amendment precedent. 
                                                     
 208. See United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 n.4 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government noted 
that Reed could have taken precautions to let the ashes or marihuana residue fall into a cup or other 
disposable container, which was then discarded before [contact with law enforcement].”). 
 209. United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other 
grounds by Garrison v. Ortiz, 296 Fed. App’x 724, 726 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 201 and 202. 
 211. Burnett, 791 F.2d at 67. 
 212. United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 210 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 213. Id. at 210. 
 214. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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C.  Credibility Determination: The Driving Force Behind Nielsen 
The analysis portion of the Nielsen opinion is split into three general 
themes.  First, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the trial court’s factual 
determinations and explained why it disagreed with those findings.215  
The bulk of the discussion centers around the credibility concerns the 
Tenth Circuit had about the officer.  Second, the opinion reviewed prior 
Tenth Circuit decisions and explained why Nielsen was 
distinguishable.216  Standing Tenth Circuit precedent at the time, namely 
Loucks, certainly suggested that the odor of burnt marijuana provided 
sufficient probable cause to search the trunk of a vehicle.  In fact, the 
Eighth Circuit had previously interpreted Loucks in precisely that manner 
when it established its own rule.217  Third, the Tenth Circuit briefly 
explained the constitutional precedent that supported its holding.  Only 
two small paragraphs discussed the constitutional justifications.  The 
sheer pervasiveness of the credibility discussion is suggestive, though far 
from conclusive, that Nielsen was determined on credibility grounds.  An 
extensive look at the language of the opinion is necessary to fully 
comprehend the extent to which a credibility determination drove the 
outcome. 
1. The District Court Was Wrong, but Not Clearly Erroneous 
A reading of the Nielsen decision reveals that the Tenth Circuit was 
concerned with the credibility of Officer Bushnell.  Because the trial 
court made factual findings about credibility, the court of appeals applied 
the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.218  “[A]s is the case with 
essentially all factual findings based upon credibility,” the Tenth Circuit 
was forced to accept the district court’s determination that Officer 
Bushnell’s testimony was credible.219 
Despite its acceptance of the trial court’s findings of fact, the Tenth 
Circuit explicitly stated that it disagreed with the district court’s findings 
on credibility, but lacked the ability to overturn on that ground.220  
                                                     
 215. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1488–89 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 216. Id. at 1489–91. 
 217. See United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Many lower courts  have 
relied primarily upon the odor of marijuana in determining that probable cause existed for a 
warrantless automobile search.” (citing Loucks, 806 F.2d at 209–11)). 
 218. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1489. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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Looking at the opinion itself, particularly the language used by the court, 
the Tenth Circuit’s disagreement with this particular outcome is easily 
ascertained. 
In support of the assertion that the Tenth Circuit overturned the 
conviction based on a credibility determination rather than constitutional 
precedent, the obvious starting point is the way the Tenth Circuit 
fashioned the legal question: “The only issue on appeal is whether a 
police officer’s alleged smell of burnt marijuana gave probable cause to 
search the trunk of the car, when there was no corroborating evidence 
that defendant had recently smoked marijuana and no marijuana was 
found in the vehicle.”221  Framing the question in this manner reveals 
four aspects of the motion to suppress hearing that undermined the 
officer’s credibility, ultimately allowing one to infer that Officer 
Bushnell perjured himself on the witness stand by stating he smelled 
burnt marijuana to validate his otherwise illegal search.  First, Nielsen 
consented to a search of the passenger compartment, but declined a 
search of the trunk.222  The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the search of 
the trunk was initiated only after the officer learned of Nielsen’s prior 
drug conviction.223  The inference to be drawn is that the officer 
developed suspicion based solely on impermissible factors and 
developed a rationale after the fact to justify his search.  Second, the 
defendant produced results of a negative urine analysis that demonstrated 
at the time of the search no marijuana was present in his system.224  This 
result further reduced the probability that marijuana was in the car, 
making it even more likely that Officer Bushnell fabricated a reason to 
search.  Third, the initial search of the passenger compartment revealed 
no evidence to corroborate Officer Bushnell’s accusation, at which point 
Officer Bushnell ended his search of the car.225  The subsequent search of 
the trunk took place only after Officer Bushnell discovered the 
defendant’s prior arrest for marijuana possession.226  Fourth, the search 
of the trunk only uncovered cocaine,227 an additional indication that 
Officer Bushnell fabricated his testimony.  With each of these operative 
facts established, the Tenth Circuit explained what possible inferences 
may be drawn from them. 
                                                     
 221. Id. at 1488 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1489. 
 225. Id. at 1488. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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The court struggled to rationalize the “incongruous facts” with the 
outcome reached by the district court.228  Of the three explanations 
presented, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the one accepted by the district 
court as the most unlikely—leaving only the credibility 
determinations.229  Either Officer Bushnell mistakenly believed he 
smelled marijuana or he fabricated the story after the unconstitutional 
search revealed contraband.230  After this discussion as to how the facts 
failed to support the district court’s findings, the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that it was procedurally bound by the lower court’s 
determinations.231 
Reviewing Nielsen, other courts split on the rationale underlying the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision.  A district court in the Third Circuit determined 
that the holding “appears, in part, to be based on the appellate court’s 
doubts about the credibility of the police in such cases, who the court 
found have ‘an incentive . . . to justify [their] actions when [they] search 
without consent.’”232  On the other hand, in United States v. Turner, the 
D.C. Circuit found that “the court’s principal concern was with the 
credibility of such an uncorroborated observation by an untrained 
‘human sniffer.’”233  Either way, the district court in the Third Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit both recognized that Nielsen was first and foremost 
predicated upon a credibility determination by the Tenth Circuit and not 
upon the announced justification. 
2. Paradigm Shift: No Longer a Probable-Cause Determination 
During a brief discussion and dismissal of Reed—a contradictory 
decision by the Fifth Circuit—the Tenth Circuit asserted that Reed was 
the only case that found “probable cause when the smell was not 
corroborated by the search.”234  Framing its analysis in such a fashion 
suggests that the Tenth Circuit looked to what the search ultimately 
revealed as a major factor in making its probable-cause determination.  
However, the results of a search should not be an indicator of whether 
probable cause existed before the search commenced.235  While no 
                                                     
 228. Id. at 1489. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. United States v. Nelson, No. 06-240, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67793, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
20, 2006) (citing Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491) (emphasis added). 
 233. United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491). 
 234. Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491 n.5. 
 235. United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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Supreme Court decision is precisely on point, the Court inferred a similar 
construction of probable cause in stating, “[t]he process does not deal 
with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”236  Complete accuracy in 
uncovering contraband as a result of the search cannot be a requirement 
for a probable-cause determination.237  Requiring every search to produce 
one-hundred percent accuracy in revealing contraband shifts the standard 
from a probability to a hard certainty, thereby eliminating a probable-
cause analysis and replacing it with an outcome-determinative test that 
decides probable cause only after the search is complete. 
The Tenth Circuit essentially imposed its own opinion about the 
officer’s credibility and, in doing so, was forced to alter the probable-
cause analysis.  This alteration replaced the probable-cause analysis with 
a credibility analysis, an indication that the Nielsen decision was driven 
by result rather than legal analysis.  The Tenth Circuit then developed a 
legal conclusion from within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to 
support its decision. 
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Distinction Provides Little Constitutional 
Protection 
Uncontroverted within the Tenth Circuit is the notion that the odor of 
burnt marijuana, standing alone, may provide probable cause sufficient 
to obtain a warrant,238 or for a warrantless search of a vehicle under the 
automobile exception.239  The Supreme Court has long recognized that a 
distinct odor alone may provide a sufficient basis for probable cause.240  
Several narcotics emit odors distinct enough to adequately allow law 
enforcement to rely on their own sense of smell in reasonably 
determining the substance, including marijuana, opium, 
methamphetamine and PCP.241  Especially after training, an officer is 
                                                     
 236. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
418 (1981)). 
 237. Michael A. Sprow, Note, Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts That Do Not 
Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289, 305 (2001). 
 238. See United States v. Garcia-Zambrano, 530 F.3d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We 
conclude that the frequent observation of the smell of burning marijuana coming from Defendant’s 
apartment, verified on four separate occasions by a trained police officer . . . was sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause.”). 
 239. See Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491 (stating that burnt marijuana can only establish probable cause 
for a search of the passenger compartment). 
 240. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (smell of burning opium establishes 
probable cause); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (smell of whiskey is a “fact indicative 
of possible crime,” though it does not allow for a warrantless search). 
 241. Sprow, supra note 237, at 313. 
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unlikely to mistake the odor of marijuana with other substances.242  There 
is little reason not to rely on odor for probable-cause determinations and 
most courts, particularly federal courts, accept this proposition. 
What is in dispute, however, is the permissible scope of a search 
based solely upon the recognition by a law-enforcement officer of the 
smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the inside of an automobile.  
This Comment has argued that the rule promulgated by the Tenth Circuit 
prohibiting the search of a trunk of an automobile based upon the smell 
of burnt marijuana is in error.  Overturning the rule would bring the 
Tenth Circuit jurisprudence back in line with other federal circuits and 
with current Fourth Amendment precedent. 
As previously discussed, both justifications asserted by the Tenth 
Circuit fail to adequately support its black-letter rule.  But viewed from a 
practical standpoint, when applied in the field, the rule becomes little 
more than a technicality.  For example, the Tenth Circuit has upheld the 
search of a trunk because the officer testified he smelled burnt and raw 
marijuana.243  A search of the passenger compartment revealed no 
corroborating evidence.244  However, when the search of the trunk 
revealed a large amount of marijuana, the Tenth Circuit automatically 
determined the officer had probable cause.245  Uttering the “magic” 
words, combined with a positive end result that supported the utterance, 
meant the court paid little attention to the credibility of the officer.  
Additionally, Wald denies probable cause to search the trunk only when 
the search of the passenger compartment fails to reveal any corroborating 
evidence.246  Through subsequent and prior case law, corroborating 
evidence has developed as little more than a formality.  Sufficient 
corroborating evidence can be as little as a few marijuana seeds247 or 
what one officer believed to be marijuana “residue.”248  It appears 
officers simply need to know the “magic” words that vault them over the 
incredibly low threshold.  With such a low standard for corroboration, 
the rule may function simply as another hoop for the officer to jump 
through rather than serving the goal of deterring illegal searches. 
                                                     
 242. Richards, supra note 76, at 360. 
 243. United States v. Frain, No. 94-4080, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 33746, **5–6 (10th Cir. Dec. 
1, 1994). 
 244. Id. at *6.  However, the officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana was corroborated when 
he found a “pipe and baggie of marijuana in the defendant’s jacket . . . .”  Id. at *7. 
 245. Id. at *7. 
 246. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226–28 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 247. United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 211 n.3 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. 
Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976)). 
 248. United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
As the only federal circuit to do so, the Tenth Circuit adopted a 
“common-sense” distinction between the permissible scope of a search 
based on the odor of burnt marijuana and a search based on the odor of 
raw marijuana.  The landmark decision spends considerable time 
analyzing the law-enforcement officer’s testimony rather than discussing 
the constitutional principles leading to its conclusion of law, indicating, 
as other federal courts have suggested, that the Nielsen decision was 
based upon a credibility determination.  A legal justification based upon 
Fourth Amendment precedent developed several years after the Tenth 
Circuit erected the distinction.  But the justification ignored clear 
constitutional principles and resurrected a soundly rejected policy that 
proved illogical and unreasonable in its application.  Nielsen’s 
conclusion was not the product of a thorough constitutional analysis but, 
instead, a response to a potential perjury by a law-enforcement officer 
attempting to validate his unconstitutional search.  Eventually, this 
outcome-driven holding developed into a bright-line rule supported by an 
evolving constitutional framework.  The Tenth Circuit’s rule is both 
impractical and contrary to established constitutional precedent.  As 
such, the Tenth Circuit should discard Nielsen and its progeny and 
replace it with the more accepted interpretation of Ross.  Because 
probable cause for a vehicle encompasses the entire vehicle once an 
officer detects the odor of burnt marijuana from inside the vehicle, the 
permissible scope of the search should encompass the entire vehicle, 
including the trunk. 
